Guide · Security

Europe's fridge cyber attacks: what food businesses should ask

In October, attackers took over the remote controls on refrigeration plant in French supermarkets and pushed it into defrost overnight. In early November the same pattern reached shops in more than ten countries, including a few British meat processors, and a report says a contractor for France's blood service was hit too. Here is what the sources confirm, what they do not, who in Dorset might have the same kind of kit, and the questions worth putting to a refrigeration engineer this week.

By Elliot · Published 4 November 2026 · 11 min read

What you need to know

  • Two waves: France on 11 to 12 October, then Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Italy, Greece, the UK and others on 2 to 3 November.
  • France's cyber agency points to exposed management interfaces and weak passwords, not a brand-new flaw. Several reports also point at the refrigeration contractor.
  • Only equipment with a network-connected supervisory unit is in range. A standalone fridge is not.
  • Britain was touched: a few meat processors reported empty abattoir units heating overnight. The NCSC called the impact minimal, and no major UK supermarket was reported hit.
Wave one: France

A warm night, caused by software

A modern supermarket does not run its fridges one cabinet at a time. A supervisory unit records the temperatures, sets when each cabinet defrosts, raises alarms and lets a contractor log in remotely to see what is going on. Defrosting is a normal job: the cabinet stops cooling for a while to clear ice. The attackers reportedly used that built-in function, locking the equipment in defrost for hours so it kept warming. Reuters put the highest temperatures at about 50°C.

Because the attacker is using the controller's own settings, the change can look like routine maintenance. Forescout makes the same point: attackers can use legitimate supervisory functions such as setpoints, schedules, alarms and users so their changes blend in. Claroty's earlier research went further, finding that an attacker could stop cooling on a compromised controller while staff still saw normal temperatures.

Danfoss told the press that most of the affected equipment was legacy hardware that no longer receives software or security updates. Researchers had published flaws in some of these controllers and fixes existed. But ANSSI's director told the French Senate that the agency's assessment pointed to exposed administration interfaces and weak passwords, not those published flaws. That is an assessment at the time, not a final finding, and it covers the French cases only.

The October incident as reported, and how firm each part is (read 4 November 2026)
QuestionWhat the sources sayHow firm
WhenOvernight on Sunday 11 October into Monday 12 October 2026Consistent across reports
What was doneControllers driven into defrost for hours, so cabinets warmed, in some cases to about 50°C (122°F). Food spoiled and some fires startedReuters, AFP and French authorities, as reported
Who was hitIntermarché, Coopérative U, Carrefour Market, Monoprix, Leclerc and Super U among othersNamed by BleepingComputer and Facilities Dive
How many storesAbout 700, according to the French economy minister speaking to Parliament on 13 October. French outlets had earlier said 250 to 350Official figure, but counts differed
Which productsDanfoss AK-SM and AK-SC, Copeland XWEB and Dixell XWEB supervisory unitsCERT-FR alert, widened on 13 October
How they got inFrance's cyber agency (ANSSI) told the Senate its assessment pointed to exposed administration interfaces and weak passwords, not the published software flawsANSSI's assessment, as reported by SentinelLABS. Not a final finding
Who did itNobody has been named. The Paris prosecutor has opened an investigationUnknown
Wave two: 2 and 3 November

The same trick, across the continent

From Monday 2 November, shops in a run of countries reported refrigeration switching to defrost or heating overnight. The European Commissioner for agriculture and food, Christophe Hansen, called it, as reported by Danish broadcaster DR, a deliberate attempt to disrupt European food security, while also saying food security was not at risk. Nobody has claimed it, and no authority has said who did it.

It was not only chains. A butcher in Athens reported its fridges set to 150°C, with staff unable to intervene because they had no access to the system. Franchised Spar shops in Belgium and at least 17 Dutch businesses were hit. In several places the reports describe an external refrigeration or maintenance provider as the target, which SentinelLABS treats as a hypothesis that does not yet show a common provider or a compromised update channel.

The November incidents by country, from news agencies and broadcasters. Provisional.
CountryWhat was reported
SwedenSeveral ICA stores and six Coop stores. ICA said its central systems were untouched and the affected stores used an external supplier. One ICA store reported freezers set to 122°F
BelgiumDelhaize through its installer Sabcobel, which said attackers remotely switched evaporators to defrost. Carrefour confirmed 15 stores, Colruyt five Spar shops, and IKEA its Mons store. One shopkeeper estimated losses of at least €60,000
NetherlandsDanfoss told Dutch broadcaster NOS that at least 17 Dutch businesses were targeted, and that the affected systems used default passwords and sat outside secure networks
IrelandA suspected attack on refrigeration at 13 SuperValu stores. Musgrave later said all stores were operating normally
GermanySupermarkets in North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria switched from cooling to heating overnight. The company that remotely maintains the systems was reportedly the target. Police are investigating an Edeka store in Reisbach
ItalyConad confirmed five stores, two in Veneto and three in Sicily. The government said impact was limited and some stores used outdated, vulnerable equipment
GreeceA butcher in Athens said its fridges were set to 150°C. Staff had no access to the system, a technician restored control after two hours, and the shop switched off its Wi-Fi
United KingdomA small number of meat-processing businesses, reportedly a few of the roughly 300 members of the Association of Independent Meat Suppliers. Some abattoir refrigeration units heated overnight, but they were empty, so no meat was lost. The association said members used the same software as the hit European supermarkets. No major UK supermarket chain was reported affected
Also reportedLuxembourg (Delhaize), Estonia (a Selver supermarket), Denmark (a food producer whose supplier stopped it), Portugal (seven Intermarché stores, an external provider appeared to be the target) and Finland (Kesko stores, cause under investigation)

Counts are moving fast and some are the retailer's own figure, some a newspaper's. Treat each line as what that source said on 2 or 3 November. Sweden's national cyber centre said the country has quite a lot of exposed operational technology devices that need updating or patching, which is the same message CERT-FR gave in October.

In Britain, the trade press reported on 3 November that the abattoir units heated up but were empty, and the National Cyber Security Centre's director of operations, Paul Chichester, said “at the moment, the impact is minimal.” The NCSC's advice to food businesses, as reported, was to address software vulnerabilities and keep contingency plans, including for moving food after a refrigeration failure. Its chief executive, Richard Horne, cited the disruption of refrigeration units across Europe in his annual review speech the same day, and listed refrigeration controls among automated processes whose security is often overlooked. We have not seen a published NCSC notice naming the products involved in the UK cases.

The blood-service report

What is, and is not, known about the plasma freezers

On 3 November the weekly Le Canard enchaîné reported an attack on Coolworld, a refrigeration contractor for the French blood service, the Établissement français du sang (EFS). Overnight on 1 to 2 November, freezers normally held at about -30°C were reportedly reprogrammed to a target of 110°C. Sites in Bourgogne-Franche-Comté are among those mentioned. The EFS first described donor samples kept for health monitoring, then confirmed that frozen plasma for patient transfusion was among the products stored in the units. The health ministry said an on-call technician noticed the rising temperature and acted, and that there were no operational consequences.

Everything beyond that is open. The 110°C figure is a programmed setpoint, not a reading from inside a freezer, so it does not show how hot anything got, or for how long. No plasma loss, withdrawn transfusion or patient harm has been confirmed, and no donor data theft has been reported. The report does not say how the attackers got in, we found no public statement from Coolworld, and no source has shown that Coolworld's equipment is one of the controller families in the October alert. Some social media posts went further than the reporting, with talk of blood nearly boiling. The reporting does not support that.

The detail worth keeping is the shape of it. A contractor held remote access to equipment in a sensitive setting, and the thing that limited the damage was a person on call who noticed the numbers going the wrong way. ANSSI's director had already warned at a Senate hearing about refrigeration risks in healthcare, and said the agency was working with the health sector's response team.

How widespread

Thousands of these units are still reachable

Forescout Vedere Labs, published 22 October 2026, plus the incident counts above. Counts of what a scan can see, not of businesses.

~700

French stores affected in October, per the economy minister to Parliament

Source: SentinelLABS

11

countries named in one agency's list of the 2 to 3 November incidents, Finland still under investigation

Source: Anadolu Agency

12,976

internet-exposed refrigeration management services in 99 countries and territories

Source: Forescout

Forescout's 12,976 exposed services came from 6,017 public addresses. By product it counted 7,075 Copeland and Dixell XWEB, 4,697 Danfoss StoreView, 551 Copeland Site Supervisor, 513 CAREL pCOWeb and 140 others. Of the Danfoss AK-SM 800A units it saw, about 80 per cent (3,762) ran firmware older than the fixed 4.3.1. It also tracked more than 20 claimed hacktivist attacks on refrigeration systems since January 2026, which it does not tie to the French or November incidents. Only 287 of the 513 pCOWeb services returned a login demand (an HTTP 401 response).

Earlier incidents show this is not new. In 2022, according to Forescout citing a Danfoss bulletin, hacktivists affected 16 Russian supermarkets and 40 Israeli stores using Danfoss AK-SM 800 units. SentinelOne's Tom Hegel says contractors who fit this equipment often do not involve a security team, which fits what the counts look like: remote access that was wanted at installation and never revisited.

Who it hits

Who should ask, and who can relax

What matters is whether your refrigeration has a connected supervisory unit.

Supermarkets and larger shops

This is who was hit first. Shops with a central refrigeration plant usually have a supervisory unit that logs temperatures, sets defrost schedules and lets a contractor log in remotely. That unit is what the attackers reached.

Franchises and independents

The second wave was not only big chains. Colruyt's franchised Spar shops, a butcher in Athens and at least 17 Dutch businesses were all hit. A shop that never thinks of itself as a target can still have a connected controller.

Hotels, pubs and restaurants with cold rooms

A walk-in cold room or a multi-cabinet kitchen can have the same kind of remote-monitoring box, fitted by the refrigeration contractor and rarely looked at again. If your engineer set up a web login so they can check it from the office, ask.

Food producers and cold stores

Anywhere that holds a lot of stock at temperature has most to lose from a warm night. A Danish food producer was targeted in the second wave, and so were British abattoirs, where the units happened to be empty. Forescout's list of exposed products includes supervisors used in cold storage as well as retail.

Anyone who relies on a contractor's remote access

In several cases the contractor, not the shop, looks like the way in: Coolworld in the blood-service report, Sabcobel in Belgium, a remote-maintenance firm in Germany. SentinelLABS treats that as a hypothesis, not a proven pattern. It still means your contractor's security is part of yours.

Ordinary fridges and freezers: not in range

A standalone fridge, an under-counter unit or a domestic freezer with no network connection cannot be reached this way. The alerts we read cover supervisory controllers, not every smart thermometer, and we have not assessed other products.

What to do

Seven steps for a food business owner

None of this needs technical knowledge. It needs one call to whoever services your refrigeration, and a written answer.

  1. Find out whether you have remote monitoring at all

    Ask your refrigeration engineer or the company that services the equipment. The giveaways are a network cable going to a control box, a login page you or the engineer can open from a browser, or an alerts service that texts the engineer when a cabinet warms. Note the make and model. The ones named so far are Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC, Copeland XWEB and Dixell XWEB.

  2. Ask whether it can be reached from the open internet

    This is the question that matters most. France's CERT says exposing a management interface to the internet is against good practice, and that access should come back only through a VPN or a protected network. An engineer who answers “it is behind a VPN” or “it connects out to our service, nothing connects in” is giving a different answer to “you can log in from anywhere with this address.” If it is open, ask for it to be taken off. Before cutting a data feed to your contractor, check your service contract and your insurance terms, as CERT-FR itself advises.

  3. Get rid of default and shared passwords

    This is where the evidence points. ANSSI's assessment of the French cases was exposed interfaces and weak passwords, and Danfoss told Dutch broadcaster NOS that the Dutch systems it saw targeted used default passwords. Forescout recommends named logins for each engineer, multi-factor sign-in on any remote access that supports it, and removing stale contractor accounts. A password that three engineers and a previous installer all know is the weak point this advice is aimed at.

  4. Ask how your contractor gets in, and how well they protect that

    Several second-wave reports describe the refrigeration provider, not the shop, as the target. Ask who at the contractor can log in to your equipment, whether those logins are personal, whether they use multi-factor sign-in, and how they would tell you if they were hit. A contractor who has never been asked may need a day to answer. That is the point of asking.

  5. Ask about the firmware and whether the model is still supported

    Danfoss describes most of the affected equipment as legacy that no longer receives security updates, and Forescout says the AK-SM 800 has been end of life since May 2021. ANSSI has said the published software flaws were not the ones used in France, so patching alone is not the whole answer, but unsupported equipment on an open connection is a standing risk. Ask for the model, the firmware version and whether the manufacturer still issues fixes. Where none exist, the honest answer is replacement, or keeping it off the internet entirely.

  6. Do not let the same system be the only thing telling you it is fine

    Claroty's research found an attacker could switch cooling off on a compromised controller while staff still saw normal temperatures on screen. The joint US advisory SentinelLABS cites suggests reviewing setpoint ranges, alerting on deviations, keeping a backup of the controller's configuration, and practising running by hand. Our own suggestion, not a regulator's, is a separate battery-powered temperature logger you read yourself, and a morning check written into the routine. In the blood-service report it was an on-call technician noticing the rising numbers that stopped the damage.

  7. If you think it has already been touched

    CERT-FR's advice, as SentinelLABS summarises it, is to preserve logs and configurations before a restart or reset where that is safe, take the device off the internet, then reset and reconfigure it, checking the defrost schedule in particular. It also warns that a factory reset alone is not enough: it removes any foothold the attacker left but leaves the same weakness in place. Involve your engineer and your insurer.

What the sources do not settle

Five things we would not claim

That it is one attack by one group. The two waves look alike, and SentinelLABS calls Russian-aligned groups a credible hypothesis, but it says responsibility is not publicly established and that nothing shows the November cases used the same route as France. How they got in. ANSSI's assessment for France was exposed interfaces and weak passwords. For November, reports point variously at a contractor, default passwords and unprotected networks. Treat all of it as provisional.

That plasma was damaged. The blood-service account rests on one weekly newspaper's reporting, as relayed by others, and on a setpoint, not a measurement. How far it reached Britain. The UK reports are a trade-press account of a few meat processors with empty units, and the NCSC says impact is minimal. We found no UK exposure figure, and a map shared on social media that shades Great Britain “attempted” carries no source, so we rely on the named reports and not the map. Treat the UK picture as early.

That we can fix it. We build and look after websites, email and the accounts around them. We do not install, test or secure refrigeration systems, and we have not scanned or touched anyone's equipment. This guide is to help you ask the right questions of the people who do.

FAQ

Fridge cyber attack questions

What happened to the fridges?

Overnight on 11 to 12 October 2026, attackers reached refrigeration supervisory units connected to the internet in French supermarkets and forced the equipment into defrost for hours. Cabinets warmed, in some cases to about 50°C, food was lost and some fires started. A second wave on 2 and 3 November hit shops in Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Italy, Greece and other countries. France's CERT-FR named Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC, Copeland XWEB and Dixell XWEB controllers.

Has a UK business been affected?

Yes, in a small way, according to the trade press on 3 November. A few members of the Association of Independent Meat Suppliers, which has about 300 members, were reported hit: some abattoir refrigeration units heated overnight, but they were empty, so no meat was lost. The association said members used the same software as the affected European supermarkets and were caught up rather than targeted. The NCSC said the impact was minimal, and no major UK supermarket chain was reported affected. We found no UK exposure figure. Ireland had 13 SuperValu stores affected, and the same products are sold in Britain.

Was France's blood service attacked?

According to one French weekly, Le Canard enchaîné, on 3 November: freezers at sites run by the blood service EFS, maintained by a contractor called Coolworld, were reprogrammed overnight on 1 to 2 November from about -30°C to a setting of 110°C. The blood service confirmed that frozen plasma for transfusion was among the products stored. The health ministry said an on-call technician noticed the rise and acted, with no operational consequences. 110°C is a programmed setpoint, not a measured temperature, and no plasma loss or patient harm has been confirmed.

Did plasma really reach 110 degrees?

Nobody has said so. Posts shared widely on social media implied blood was nearly boiled. The reporting says a controller target was changed, and says nothing public shows how hot the storage got or for how long. A setpoint is an instruction to the equipment, and it takes time to act on a large cold store. That is why the independent temperature check matters.

Is my café or small shop at risk?

Only if your refrigeration has a network-connected supervisory unit, typically a box that lets an engineer log in remotely. An ordinary fridge or freezer with no connection cannot be reached this way. The second wave included franchise shops and a butcher, so size is no protection if the equipment is connected. If you are not sure which you have, ask whoever services your refrigeration. It is a two-minute question.

Who is behind it?

Nobody has been named and no group has claimed responsibility. SentinelLABS says Russian-aligned groups are a credible hypothesis, because of earlier US charges over attacks on industrial controls, but it says responsibility is not publicly established. A claim by one group of an intrusion at a Spanish supermarket appears only in an archived Telegram repost. Treat attribution as open.

Does a factory reset fix a compromised controller?

Not by itself. CERT-FR says a reset removes the attacker's foothold but leaves the device exposed to the same attack, and a compromised unit can keep persistence mechanisms after a reset. The order is: preserve logs where safe, take it off the internet, reset or restart it, reconfigure it, and only then restore access through a VPN or protected network.

Should I unplug it?

Do not switch off your refrigeration. The advice is to take the management interface off the open internet, not to stop the equipment cooling. Talk to your engineer first, because some service contracts and insurance policies depend on the remote data feed. CERT-FR says to check those terms before cutting it.

Can I check whether my equipment is visible online?

Your engineer can tell you quickly, and it is the right first step. A search for your own business's public address on a service such as Shodan will show what is reachable. Do not scan or probe equipment that belongs to anyone else: it can amount to an offence under the Computer Misuse Act.

References

Sources & further reading

The guidance on this page is grounded in primary sources. Follow the links to read them in full.

Not sure who looks after your systems?

We do not do refrigeration, but we can go through the web side of your business with you: who holds which passwords, who can log in, and who is responsible for keeping the website patched. No obligation.